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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. The central aim 
The central aim of this dissertation is to put forth a version of pragmatism – more 
specifically, a logically consistent structure for a global kind of pragmatism. Prag-
matism, as it is understood here, is an approach in philosophy of language that 
aims to provide an account of meanings of expressions in terms of how the expres-
sions are used in a linguistic community, and not in terms of how they represent 
the mind- and language-independent world. Global pragmatism seeks to extend, 
or globalize, this non-representational stance to all discourses. This amounts to a 
rejection of the representationalist conviction that there are at least some expres-
sions in some discourses that refer to some aspect of an objective external reality. 
For global pragmatists, no discourse provides this kind of a privileged representa-
tion of how things are in a discourse-independent world. In their view, there are 
simply a range of different language games, each fit for its own aims. This kind 
of approach has been advanced by pragmatist thinkers like Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Richard Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom and Huw Price. 
Global pragmatists reject representationalism because they think that it is 
based on a false hope of some independent and objective access to reality. Prag-
matists take seriously our human condition in which all our inquiries are bound 
up with different contingent contexts – our practices, aims, sensory and techno-
logical capacities, etc. Pragmatists emphasize that although we cannot observe 
how things really are, we can observe the various ways in which we talk about 
things. Thus, we should always proceed from the fact that we find ourselves using 
certain expressions embedded in certain discursive practices. That is to say, global 
pragmatists commit to discourse priority. In this way pragmatists invite us to 
restrain our metaphysical urges – our desire to have a one true account of how 
things really are. These urges, exemplified by representationalism, give rise to all 
sorts of recurrent metaphysical problems, like questions about the place of mind, 
meaning and morality in the natural world, or about what kinds of things really 
exist. Instead of doing metaphysics, we should aim to construct discourse-
dependent narratives of how and why we came to talk about meanings, moral 
properties, values, coffee mugs, elementary particles, minds, numbers, etc. 
In sum, two defining commitments of contemporary global pragmatism are 
global non-representationalism and discourse priority (cf. Macarthur and Price 
2007: 95–97, Williams 2009: xiv–xv, Williams 2013: 128). The focus of my dis-
sertation is global non-representationalism. Global pragmatists endorse a world-
view according to which there are no substantially representational discourses. 
However, this view threatens to render the project of global pragmatism incon-
sistent. To begin with, if no discourse represents anything at all, in what sense 
can we say of a statement that it is true or false? And in what sense can we say of 
an expression that it means something? In response, pragmatists offer alternative 
non-representational use-theoretical accounts of how expressions get their 
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meanings, and of the role of truth-predicate in our language. However, these 
global non-representationalist accounts, which take every discourse, including 
semantics itself, to be non-representational, lead to a further problem. In these 
accounts, semantic notions (truth, meaning, representation, reference) are them-
selves deflated in the sense that they do not correspond to any aspect of the pur-
ported mind- and language-independent world. But given this deflated sense – in 
which the concept of representation itself does not represent in any substantial 
way – every sufficiently structured discourse automatically turns out to be 
representational. How can global pragmatists then deny that there are representa-
tional discourses? It seems that this very denial itself implies a more substantial 
concept of representation than non-representational semantics would allow for. 
If so, then global pragmatism as global non-representationalism turns out to be 
inconsistent. This leads to a question as to how global pragmatists should state 
their commitment to global non-representationalism. 
The central point of my dissertation is to suggest the following solution for 
global pragmatists. First, global pragmatists should adopt a two-fold conception 
of truth (representational and non-representational truth) as well as a bifurcation 
of other semantic notions. And second, global pragmatists should regard the dis-
course about semantics itself as apt for merely non-representational treatment. In 
other words, they should regard meta-semantics as non-representational. Meta-
semantics is the discourse about the truth and meaning of semantic statements 
(which include some semantic notions), just as semantic statements form a dis-
course about the truth and meaning of ordinary, non-semantic statements (which 
do not include any semantic notions). According to the proposed meta-semantic 
assumption, sentences that ascribe semantic predicates (such as “is true”, “rep-
resents”, “refers”, “has a truth condition”, “means”) themselves do not represent 
any aspect of a language-independent reality. This meta-semantic assumption and 
a pluralistic conception of truth and meaning provide global pragmatists with 
sufficient conceptual and structural resources to deny the representational truth 
for semantic claims and still allow other discourses to be apt for representational 
truth. As I will argue, this approach secures the logical consistency of global prag-
matism while enabling them to maintain a global non-representationalist stance. 
It is a structural solution in the sense that it does not prescribe any specific non-
representational account. Indeed, several options remain open for global prag-
matists.  
In sum, I think that the non-representationalism of global pragmatists is best 
understood as a combination of meta-semantic non-representationalism and bi-
furcated object-level semantics. The two defining commitments of global prag-
matism should thus be rephrased as discourse priority and meta-semantic non-
representationalism. By contrast, representationalism commits to meta-semantic 
representationalism, which goes hand-in-hand with a metaphysics-first attitude. 
The remainder of this section will introduce representationalism in further detail 
and outline some versions of non-representationalist semantics that the global 
pragmatist can work with. In section 2, I explain how the arguments presented in 
the three research articles of my dissertation pertain to my central thesis. In 
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section 3, I explicate how Hilary Putnam’s and Saul Kripke’s skeptical arguments 
reveal a potential hidden inconsistency in the accounts that seek to reject 
representationalism. In section 4, I elaborate on this potential inconsistency of 
global pragmatism and offer a meta-semantic solution that secures the logical 
consistency. Furthermore, I explain how to apply this solution to other so-called 




1.2. Background  
Our attempts to reflect on the relation between language and the world are quite 
commonly governed by representationalist intuitions. According to representa-
tionalism, there is a substantial relationship between our expressions and the 
external world such that at least some expressions (e.g., the term “coffee mug”) 
objectively stand for or refer to some external, language- and mind-independent 
reality (e.g., coffee mugs). These substantial relations are established by extra-
linguistic meaning-determining facts, as described by, for example, causal theories 
of reference. Thus, the essential core of representationalism is a referential ap-
proach that explains semantic properties (truth, meaning, representation, reference) 
in terms of the referential relations to extralinguistic things. In the case of lan-
guage, proper names are taken to refer or correspond to the objects that cause the 
tokening of those proper names, predicates refer or correspond to properties that 
the objects have, and so forth. Descriptive sentences and theories present us with 
a picture of the world, to echo a metaphor from early Wittgenstein. Representa-
tionalism is naturally accompanied by the correspondence theory of truth, which 
states that in order for a statement to be true, it has to correspond to, map onto or 
represent a mind- and language-independent reality. 
On this view of the relation between language and reality, true descriptive 
sentences come with corresponding metaphysical commitments. For example, 
according to representationalism, the term “coffee mug” in the sentence “the coffee 
mug is on the table” refers to the coffee mug, and “table” refers to the table. Thus, 
if this sentence is taken to be true, it commits us to the existence of a coffee mug 
and a table in the external world. Similarly and more alarmingly, if we take the 
sentences “murder is wrong” and “Mona Lisa is beautiful” to be true descriptions 
of some aspects of the world, then it would seem that we are committed to 
the existence of entities such as wrongness and beauty in the external world. 
Representationalists who want to refrain from committing to such dubious 
entities have to provide some non-representational account of the meaning of 
these particular kinds of sentences. For example, they might endorse an emotivist 
or expressivist theory of ethics – i.e., a local non-representational account of one 
particular discourse – while remaining representationalists about the discourse on 
ordinary objects. 
Historically, one of the central motifs of pragmatism has been the rejection of 
representationalism and the correspondence theory of truth in order to avoid 
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metaphysical commitments of the aforementioned kind (see Bernstein 2010, Misak 
2016). A notable contemporary global version of that rejection is Huw Price’s 
global expressivism, which globalizes expressivism to all discourses and rejects 
representationalism tout court (Price 2011, 2013). In his case, the term ‘ex-
pressivism’ does not allude to our statements expressing psychological states as 
in expressivist theories of ethics, but has a broader meaning of theorizing about 
the use of language without relying on representationalist semantic notions. Other 
notable contemporary pragmatists pushing for a global rejection of representa-
tionalism include Richard Rorty (1979), Robert Brandom (2008), Michael 
Williams (2010, 2013) and also Paul Horwich (1998) who does not explicitly call 
himself a pragmatist, but is one of the central thinkers in the non-representa-
tionalist camp.   
In general, pragmatists aspire to replace the representational approach to 
semantics with a use-theoretic one. According to the latter, the meaning of an 
item – linguistic or other – is given by the way discursive community uses it, espe-
cially as a basis for action. To possess or to understand a concept is to know how 
to use a word. Pragmatists sometimes put the point metaphorically – language is 
better understood as a set of tools, rather than a mirror of nature.  
Use theories of meaning differ over which aspect of language use is the most 
important one. A prominent class of use theories gives the central role to inferen-
tial relations between meaningful items. Such theories are collectively known as 
inferential role semantics or inferentialism. The general idea of inferentialism is 
that semantic features of expressions are exhaustively determined by their place 
in communally accepted inference patterns.  
The inferentialist approach has been quite common among eminent prag-
matists. It has been explicitly endorsed by Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Robert 
Brandom and Huw Price. Sellars (2007) was the first to situate inferential rela-
tions explicitly and systematically at the center of the theory of meaning. Perhaps 
the most developed contemporary account of inferentialism has been put forth by 
Brandom (1994, 2000). Both Sellars and Brandom emphasize that descriptive use 
of vocabulary is meaningful only in an inferentially articulated space of reasons 
or implications. For example, in order to meaningfully assert, “the coffee mug is 
on the table”, I undertake a series of inferentially articulated commitments: I put 
the sentence forward as a premise for further inferences and commit myself prac-
tically to statements like “the mug is on the table”, “there is a table”, “the table is 
solid enough to hold a coffee mug”, etc. I also put myself forth as being entitled 
to assert such a statement. Depending on the context, this might commit me to 
various further statements – say, the description of me being in a perceptual state 
of seeing a coffee cup on a table. Only in such a space of implications can a 
vocabulary attain meanings. In order to understand a sentence, the language user 
must be able to notice what follows from it, and the evidence for or against it, in 
the space of implications provided by the language game at hand. 
This view of semantics is coherent with the classical logical positivist slogan 
that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification. Inferentialists 
approve of this slogan in its general form – for them, the meaning of a statement 
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is given by its verification by other statements in a web of inferences. However, 
the crucial difference is that logical positivists were empiricist foundationalists, 
for whom sense experience was the ultimate basis of justification. Thus, they 
granted a special status to one particular vocabulary – i.e., the vocabulary of ob-
servational reports – which was then supposed to serve as a basis for the meanings 
of other sentences. Global pragmatists, by contrast, are non-foundationalist neo-
positivists – instead of some purportedly foundational source of justification, they 
look to, say, community’s standards for what counts as evidence (see Rorty 1999: 
151–155). In their view, reports of sense experience are not autonomous of such 
(non-universal and shifting) standards. Brandom explains the inferentialists’ take 
on the matter as follows:  
 
[T]he proposed empiricist base vocabulary is not pragmatically autonomous, and 
hence not semantically autonomous. Observational vocabulary is not a vocabulary 
one could use though one used no other. Noninferential reports of the results of 
observation do not form an autonomous stratum of language. In particular, when 
we look at what one must do to count as making a noninferential report, we see 
that that is not a practice one could engage in except in the context of inferential 
practices of using those observations as premises from which to draw inferential 
conclusions, as reasons for making judgments and undertaking commitments that 
are not themselves observations. (Brandom 2015: 124) 
 
For example, in order for an allegedly autonomous empirical report such as “I see 
a coffee mug on the table” to be meaningful, there has to be a community of 
speakers engaged in a practice where words such as “cup”, “table” and “see” are 
regularly used and linked to other words like “objects”, “drinking”, “eyes”, etc. 
Furthermore, this sentence must figure as a knot in a web of inferential relations – 
it must serve as a premise or conclusion of various practical entailments. Hence, 
the statement “I see a coffee mug on the table” is not an autonomous non-
inferential report. 
Global pragmatists, endorsing some non-representational semantics like 
inferentialism, are semantic holists. For them, the smallest autonomous unit of 
meaning is not a word or a sentence, nor even an observation sentence, but the 
whole constellation of sentences held true or false in a community’s language 
game. By contrast, representationalists are semantic atomists. In their view, a 
sentence can be meaningful even if we do not assume a wider practice of language 
users in the background. A single word could have a meaning without there even 
being any other words, for it suffices that there is a substantial reference relation 
between the word and the world. In that case, it would just be an objective 
semantic fact that “mug”, for example, refers to mugs, regardless of whether there 
happens to be a community who uses this term in playing a certain language game.  
Along with representational semantics, global pragmatists reject the corres-
pondence theory of truth. They have several alternatives. According to the simplest 
forms of classical pragmatist views on truth, a statement is true if acting according 
to it helps the community to achieve its aims. However, instead of such a classical 
pragmatist theory, the global pragmatist could also adopt a deflationary or 
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minimal view of truth (e.g., Horwich 1998). Deflationary views are likewise non-
representational, in the sense that according to these views, the truth-predicate 
does not refer to any substantive property in the world that we could investigate 
or discover. Everything there is to say about truth is captured by a trivial equi-
valence schema: “<p> is true iff p”. Following Horwich, Amy Thomasson has 
suggested combining the deflationary approach to truth with a use theory of 
meaning: 
 
We can now see that there is good reason for pairing the deflationary approach to 
truth with a use theory of meaning: for then we may treat the meaning of ‘… is 
true’ as constituted by the core rule of use captured by the trivial equivalence 
schema /---/  – and yet do so without abandoning the core deflationary idea that 
there is no substantive property of truth with a nature to be uncovered by scientific 
or philosophical investigation. (Thomasson 2014: 194–195) 
 
So, global pragmatists can adopt the position that the concept of truth does not 
have any deep metaphysical content for us to investigate. Among self-avowed 
pragmatists, this kind of view has been expressed by Richard Rorty (see Rorty 
1995, 1999). Rorty thinks that what really matters instead of truth is the process 
of justifying one’s beliefs to an audience: 
 
We are inclined to say that truth is the aim of inquiry. But I think we pragmatists 
must grasp the nettle and say that this claim is either empty or false. Inquiry and 
justification have lots of mutual aims, but they do not have an overarching aim 
called truth. Inquiry and justification are activities we language-users cannot help 
engaging in; we do not need a goal called ‘truth’ to help us do so, any more than 
our digestive organs need a goal called health to set them to work. (Rorty 1999: 
37–38) 
 
An intuitive counterargument to this is that a statement can be true – in the sense 
of capturing how things really are – even when it is not justified to any audience. 
Yet, this intuitive counterargument is intelligible only on the assumption of a 
representationalist framework. Pragmatists reject that kind of framework. They 
offer alternative stories about the diverse roles of the truth-predicate in our lan-
guage. For example, we use it to endorse statements or in situations where we 
want to express our fallibility or a need to reconsider our justifications in the light 
of some possible new information. It is useful to have a predicate to express such 
a need. In our language, in that case we can say: “It might be justified, but is it 
true?” 
Thus, there are several combinations of views available for global pragmatists. 
For example, they can combine some use theory of meaning with either a prag-
matist or a deflationary theory of truth. In what follows, I refer to all of these 





2. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ARTICLES 
My dissertation is comprised of three articles: “The Dilemma Imposed on the 
Realist by Putnam’s and Kripkensteinian Argument” (Sova 2017), “A Non-sub-
stantial Meta-semantics for Global Expressivism” (Sova 2019) and “Assessment 
relativism and the truth-predicate” (Sova 2021). The central thesis of the project – 
i.e., that global pragmatists should work with two truth-predicates and postulate 
that meta-semantics is apt for only non-representational truth – is most fully 
explicated in (Sova 2019) in the context of global expressivism, that is, Huw 
Price’s version of global pragmatism. In this section, I explain how the arguments 
pursued in the other two articles (Sova 2017 and 2021) support the central thesis.  
In (Sova 2017), I show that certain arguments of Hilary Putnam (1977, 1980, 
1981) and Saul Kripke (1982) set certain constraints on the semantic facts suitable 
for representationalism. Representationalists have namely no choice but to go 
robust – that is, they must postulate unobservable meaning-determining semantic 
facts. I claim that these arguments also show that if one wants to reject robust 
representationalism, as global pragmatists do, then they have to accept meaning-
minimalism – the view that there are no representational truth-conditions for 
ascribing a meaning to something (meaning-ascriptions). This amounts to saying 
that there is no fact of the matter, in the representationalist sense, what any pur-
portedly meaningful item means. Hence, in my interpretation, these arguments 
are effectively theoretical mechanisms that force us to choose between two views – 
meaning-minimalism and robust representationalism – each of which faces its 
own problems (see section 3). This is relevant to global pragmatists – given that 
they want to reject representationalism, these arguments force them to bear the 
consequences of meaning-minimalism.  
Crispin Wright (1984, 1992) and Paul Boghossian (1989, 1990) have pursued 
two lines of argument for the conclusion that meaning-minimalism is inconsistent 
(see also Hale 2017: 626–628). The first one claims that meaning-minimalism 
automatically globalizes beyond meaning-ascriptions to include all sentences, with 
the result that there are no sentences with truth-conditions (Wright 1992: 214–
217). This proliferation of minimalism renders the position self-refuting. The 
other line of argument states that meaning-minimalism entails inconsistent claims 
about the truth-predicate (Boghossian 1989: 525–526).  
Without a consistent formulation of meaning-minimalism, it would seem that 
the arguments of Putnam and Kripke force us to abandon global pragmatism and 
accept representationalism with its robust semantic facts. However, in (Sova 
2017: 77–78) and (Sova 2019: 508–510) I argue that these arguments fail to show 
that meaning-minimalism leads to a contradiction. For this purpose, I rely on 
Wright’s suggestions on how to solve the potential inconsistencies of meaning-
minimalism (see Wright 1992: 231–236). I generalize his suggestions and apply 
them in the service of global pragmatism. The upshot of the resulting solution is 
that global pragmatists should work with a bifurcated object-level semantics – 
i.e., representational and non-representational – while regarding meta-semantics 
as strictly non-representational (see Sova 2019: 508–511). This secures the 
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logical consistency of global pragmatism and is a central feature of global prag-
matism, in addition to discourse priority. 
The proposed structure allows global pragmatists to regard some non-semantic 
statements (i.e., statements that do not include semantic notions) representa-
tionally true while still maintaining a global non-representationalist stance. This 
is made possible by the meta-semantic conviction that sentences which ascribe 
representational truth are themselves apt for merely non-representational truth 
(see section 4.1 for further elaboration). However, there is a potential counter-
argument to that solution from the equivalence schema for truth (see section 4.4). 
In (Sova 2021), I discuss the counterargument in the context of John MacFarlane’s 
(2014) assessment-relativism, but the argument could be just as well summoned 
against global pragmatism. The argument claims that ascription of one kind of truth 
(e.g., representational truth) entails that the same kind of truth should be applied 
to that ascription itself. Thus, concludes the argument, global pragmatists cannot 
ascribe representational truth to non-semantic expressions without spreading it 
also to the meta-level. However, I argue that the argument is not valid. I conclude 
that there is no general counterargument from the equivalence schema to the 





In (Sova 2017) I argue for the conclusion that Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic 
indeterminacy argument (1977, 1980, 1981) and Saul Kripke’s so-called Kripken-
steinian argument (1982) present the representationalist with a dilemma that 
forces them either to give up representationalism or adopt a robust semantic 
realism. In this section, I provide a general overview of these arguments, starting 
with Putnam’s model-theoretic argument.  
Putnam’s model-theoretic argument was originally designed to rebut external 
realists (or, in Putnam’s terminology, metaphysical realists). However, external 
realists are also representationalists – one essential feature of their view is that 
true sentences correspond to or represent a mind- and language-independent reality 
(Sova 2017: 64). This is the feature that Putnam’s argument intends to exploit.  
The gist of Putnam’s case against realism is an argument from indeterminacy. 
If we assume the representationalists’ correspondence theory of truth, then even 
for an epistemically and empirically ideal theory of the world (i.e., one that is 
maximally elegant, simple, makes exclusively correct predictions and retro-
dictions) there is an infinite amount of different models that make the theory true. 
In other words, even an epistemically and empirically ideal theory might not give 
us the true account of the real world, for there are countless possible permutations 
of objects that render exactly the same claims of the theory true. Our theories 
leave the external world indeterminate.  
The problem for representationalists (and external realists) is that this skeptical 
possibility is not just another innocuous thought exercise, but threatens to render 
their whole position inconsistent. In order to explicate the issue, I begin with Tim 
Button’s (2013) novel reconstruction of Putnam’s arguments (see Sova 2017: 64–
68). One essential feature of both external realism and representationalism is a 
distinction between the truth of a theory and empirical adequacy of a theory 
(Button 2013: ch 6, Sova 2017: 66–67). Representationalists assume that there 
exists a mind-, theory- and language-independent external world that our mental 
states, theories and statements must represent in order to be true. A corollary of 
this assumption is that empirical adequacy does not by itself suffice for the truth 
of a theory. For truth, the theory must also represent how things really are, regard-
less of the state of our cognitive capacities. According to representationalists, 
even an epistemically and empirically ideal theory can present us a false picture 
of what is metaphysically real. Thus, representationalism presupposes some sort 
of distinction between what is given to us in observation and the external world 
that contains the relevant truth-makers required by the correspondence theory. 
We can think of it as there being a veil that separates us from the real world 
(Button 2013: 40–41). The precise nature of the veil – whether it is said to consist 
in sensations, phenomena, observables, etc. – does not matter. Putnam’s argu-
ment exploits namely the structural dichotomy between our cognitive capacities 
and the objective world.  
3. PUTNAM’S AND KRIPKE’S ARGUMENTS 
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Now we can explain the representationalist’s predicament as follows. Accord-
ing to representationalists, semantic postulates have certain truth-conditions of 
the kind required by the correspondence theory of truth – in other words, there 
are certain states of the external world in the case of which it is true to say that a 
certain word has a certain reference or that a meaning-bearing item has a certain 
meaning. The question now becomes, in what terms can the representationalist 
express these truth-conditions? Remember that for the representationalist, semantic 
postulates must, in order to be true, correspond to how things really are on the 
other side of the veil. Thus, if the representationalist expresses the truth-condi-
tions of their semantic postulates in terms of what is given to us in observation – 
in terms of what lies on our side of the veil, so to speak – then we can apply 
Putnam’s argument against them. Explicating the truth-conditions in terms of 
what lies on our side of the veil opens up the possibility of permutations on the 
other side of the veil, such that there are always countless mutually incompatible 
interpretations of the real world available for the same empirical truth-conditions. 
For example, the very same empirical truth-conditions could be consistently held 
for both the sentence “‘the mug is on the table’ means that in the real world, there 
is a mug on a table” and the sentence “‘the mug is on the table’ means that in the 
real world, there is a mug in a cupboard”. All we need to do is permute the relevant 
reference relations accordingly. 
This kind of semantic skepticism is not just another innocuous whimsy about 
how our theory of the world might be false. This potentially renders their position 
inconsistent. Both representationalists and pragmatists agree that our expressions 
and thoughts mean something. In representationalists’ view, meaning something 
is possible only if meaningful items somehow reach or refer to the other side of the 
veil. Putnam’s argument shows that there is no coherent empirical route to the 
other side. Thus, the representationalist is forced to concede that meaning-ascrip-
tions have non-empirical truth-conditions, i.e., conditions given in terms of states 
of affairs on the other side of the veil. This amounts to accepting that these semantic 
facts must be robust – that they are unobservable, non-empirical postulates.  
In (Sova 2017: 71–76) I show how the Kripkensteinian argument has the same 
conclusion as Putnam’s model-theoretic one. The Kripkensteinian skeptical point 
is precisely that for whatever empirical truth-conditions we might assume for the 
meaning of a sign (e.g., how the sign has been used in the past), there are always 
deviant meaning-ascriptions available such that the empirical truth-conditions 
remain the same. Hence the dilemma for the representationalist – meaning-ascrip-
tions must either have non-empirical truth-conditions or no truth-conditions at all 
(the view known as meaning-minimalism). 
In sum, what these arguments properly show is not that representationalism 
and external realism are inherently inconsistent, but rather that the adherents of 
these positions must concede that their worldview is perhaps more extreme than 
they would like – they have to commit to robust semantic facts. The same con-
clusion with regard to the significance of Putnam’s argument has been drawn by 




That leaves the metaphysical realist the options of faulting the detail of the stages 
of the argument, or living with its conclusion: that to conceive of the world in a 
certain kind of robustly autonomous fashion is to consign the relation between the 
vehicles of our thought and the taxonomy of the world to unaccountability. Putnam 
effectively ridicules such an upshot. But ridicule, it may be countered, is no sub-
stitute for argument. Any broad philosophical system will have its primitive notions 
and theses. Further argument may be demanded as to why metaphysical realism 
may not legitimately go primitive at the interface between language and the world. 
(Hale and Wright 2017: 721) 
 
Indeed, it is logically legitimate for external realists and representationalists to go 
primitive, however, global pragmatists invite us to consider reasons not to. Prag-
matists believe that representationalist thinking produces unsolvable and frankly 
unnecessary metaphysical problems. Pragmatists keep reminding us about the con-
dition we as humans find ourselves in – namely that we do not have some objective 
access to how things really are, independent of our contingent contexts of inquiry. 
This skeptical point is exploited by Putnam and Kripke to show that representa-
tionalists have no choice but to go robust. Robust semantic facts, however, place 
an additional metaphysical burden on representationalists. If there is an alter-
native account available that does not need to postulate unobservable semantic 
facts, then it seems that the burden of proof lies on the representationalists to 
explain why we should prefer their metaphysically more promiscuous account 
instead. 
However, the dilemma set up by Putnam and Kripke also shows that if global 
pragmatists want to reject representationalism, they have to accept meaning-
minimalism – i.e., the view that meaning-ascriptions do not have truth-conditions. 
This poses a potential problem for pragmatists, for Wright (1984, 1992) and Bog-
hossian (1989, 1990) have argued that meaning-minimalism is logically incon-
sistent. So, global pragmatists have to respond to these arguments, or else suffer 
from this inconsistency too. I examine Wright’s and Boghossian’s arguments in 
(Sova 2017: 77–78) and (Sova 2019: 507–511), respectively, and conclude that 
they fail to establish the inconsistency of meaning-minimalism. In what follows, 
I will not go over the specifics of Wright’s and Boghossian’s arguments, but in-
troduce the general worry that they raise (and the solution) more directly in terms 





4. THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSISTENT GLOBAL 
PRAGMATISM 
4.1. The consistency of global pragmatism 
Global pragmatists qua global non-representationalists hold that all semantic 
claims are non-representational. This amounts to saying that no semantic predicate 
(truth, meaning, representation, reference) or semantic sentence (ascription of 
such a predicate to an object) represents any aspect of some mind- and language-
independent reality. Let us label this position as semantic-minimalism and define 
it as follows: 
 
(1) Semantic sentences do not have a representational function. 
 
From (1) it follows that semantic sentences do not have truth-conditions in the 
representationalist sense. If we assumed that the only truth-predicate available is 
the representationalist one that marks correspondence, then (1) would be quite 
obviously self-refuting. For (1) is itself a semantic sentence – it includes the 
semantic predicate “has a representational function”. Thus, in the representa-
tionalist framework, (1) cannot represent anything, and therefore is not truth-con-
ditional, and therefore cannot be true. Pragmatists, however, can easily sidestep 
this problem by noting that (1) rules out only the representationalist truth-
conditions, but does not imply anything about truth-conditions in the sense of 
some non-representational theory of truth. In a non-representational framework, 
(1) is something that can be true. 
And yet, this pragmatist maneuver gives rise to another, more subtle problem. 
(1) deflates all semantic notions so that they end up not corresponding to any aspect 
of the purported mind- and language-independent world. Thus, the notion of 
representation itself is also deflated so that any sufficiently structured discourse 
automatically counts as representational. So the question remains as to how could 
global pragmatist consistently deny representational truth for any meaningful dis-
course. In other words, in what sense can they describe themselves as global non-
representationalists? 
In my view, the best response available to global pragmatists is the following 
(see Sova 2019: 508–513). Global pragmatists should work with two distinct 
truth-predicates – a representational one and non-representational (e.g., pragmatic) 
one. In other words, global pragmatists should accept that there are two kinds of 
roles that a truth-predicate might play in our language. One kind of role comes up 
in language games where our intention is to claim something about the extra-
linguistic world. The other, non-representational role comprises the endorsement 
of statements, commending of statements as fit for achieving the community’s 
aims, contrasting current justifications with possible future rebuttals, etc. Along 
with the two truth-predicates, pragmatists should endorse a more general bifurca-
tion of semantics into a representational and non-representational one. Having 
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assumed such a diversity of the roles for semantic predicates, global pragmatists 
should further assume that meta-semantics is apt for non-representational treat-
ment only. That is, the discourse of ascribing truth and meaning to expressions is 
itself apt for merely non-representational truth and meaning.  
In this framework, (1) and global pragmatism are not self-refuting. Since global 
pragmatists are armed with two truth-predicates, they have a notion of representa-
tional truth in their arsenal, which could be either affirmed or denied of any non-
semantic discourse (a discourse that does not include semantic notions). Yet, on 
the assumption of non-representational meta-semantics, this representational truth 
is deflated so that, on the one hand, such an affirmation or denial does not result 
in an inconsistency and, on the other hand, it nevertheless makes sense to describe 
the pragmatist as a global non-representationalist. Pragmatists do not have to 
accept their opponents’ claim that in deflated meta-semantics, every meaningful 
discourse turns out to be representational. With a pluralist conception of object-
level semantics and a non-representational meta-semantics, pragmatists have the 
necessary semantic resources for distinguishing between representational and non-
representational discourses, and making the respective denials on their own terms. 
In this set-up, pragmatists can consistently deny representational truth for any 
discourse, because the semantics of their denial is given in their meta-semantic 
framework, not in the representationalist one. 
Thus, as I said, global pragmatists can affirm the representational truth of non-
semantic statements. For example, global pragmatists can accept that the sentence 
“the mug is on the table” is representationally true. This would amount to making 
the following semantic claim: “The sentence ‘the mug is on the table’ represents 
the external world such that there is a mug on a table.” Since meta-semantics is 
apt for merely non-representational truth, this semantic claim might be true, 
but only in a non-representational sense. Depending on our choice of the non-
representational theory of truth, we could interpret this as the semantic claim 
having a certain location in the web of inferential relations, or perhaps having 
proven useful for our aims, etc. The main point is that the semantic sentence itself 
is not held to represent some objective aspect of the world, but that its meaning 
and truth-value are a function of how this particular set of words is used in a 
language game. Non-representational meta-semantics stipulates that the talk 
about how sentences represent some extralinguistic reality gets its meaning only 
due to being part of a language game. The same meta-semantic stance applies to 
any meaningful items we might want to consider, e.g. thoughts. Our meta-
thoughts about having thoughts about the external world have the content that 
they do only due to being part of certain discursive practices. This meta-semantic 
stance captures the global pragmatists’ commitment to global non-
representationalism. 
Thus, the disagreement between representationalists and global pragmatists is 
not over whether there are representational discourses or not. Rather, the dis-
agreement concerns how to interpret representational discourses – or, in other 
words, the disagreement concerns meta-semantics. In the representationalists’ 
view, semantic sentences have to represent an aspect of the objective world – 
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namely certain objective, discourse-independent semantic facts. These purported 
facts should guarantee that at least some expressions latch on to a reality outside 
the limits of human contingencies and practices. By contrast, global pragmatists 
qua global non-representationalists claim that no expressions are capable of 
referring to states of affairs independently of our current discursive practices. This 
human predicament is accounted for by non-representational meta-semantics. At 
first, descriptive non-semantic sentences might seem to capture how things are in 
a discourse-independent world. However, their discourse-dependence is estab-
lished by the non-representationality of semantic sentences that state what these 
object-level sentences mean and when they are true. This establishes global prag-
matists’ global non-representationalism – i.e., the conviction that there is no ulti-
mate interpretation of sentences that could capture how things really are in a dis-
course-independent world.  
 
 
 4.2. The consistency of other global positions 
The solution proposed here has applications beyond pragmatism. Similar argu-
ments from self-refutation have been applied against various other globalizations, 
such as global relativism or global social constructivism. Let us take the example 
of relativism. Global relativists want to claim, roughly, that everything is relative. 
This naturally leads to the question, how should we regard this very claim itself – 
is it also merely relatively true, as opposed to absolutely true? If global relativists 
allowed for this contrast to be considered in the first place, then it would seem 
that they are faced with a choice between sounding whimsical and conceding in-
consistently that there are some absolute facts after all. 
Relativists can help themselves to a solution structurally similar to the one that 
we outlined for global pragmatists. If they want to go global, they should begin by 
postulating that meta-semantics is non-representational. Next, they can elaborate 
on what this non-representationality consists in, depending on the details of their 
position. For global relativists, it consists in holding that meta-semantics is relative. 
Global relativists should thus qualify their position semantically and state that all 
semantic distinctions are only relatively true. Declaring meta-semantics non-
representational eliminates the possibility of a contrast with some absolute truth. 
This is something that a non-relativist cannot accept, because they want to main-
tain that certain discourses are apt for absolute truth in a non-relativized sense. 
So when global relativists are questioned whether their relativism is true absolutely 
or relatively, their answer should be that since meta-semantics is relative, global 
relativism can only be relatively true – but not “only” in the unfortunate sense 
that it fails to grasp some more substantial truth out there, but in the sense that 
this is the only kind of truth to be had on a meta-semantic level. If this feels a bit 
too thin for the opponent, it is merely because the opponent already assumes a 




4.3. Advantages of the meta-semantic approach 
over quietism 
Classic global pragmatist Richard Rorty and contemporary global pragmatist 
Huw Price have addressed the self-refutation problem arising from (1) in a 
slightly different way, giving what I call the quietist response. Price (2009, 2013: 
12) suggests that global pragmatists should say nothing in their theoretical voice 
about whether the terms or statements of some target discourse have or lack some 
semantic feature – whether they are, for example, representational or not. Price 
suggests that global pragmatists (or, in his terminology, global expressivists) 
should simply abandon any pro- or anti-representational claims. Abandoning or 
not endorsing semantic claims does not entail denying them. Global expressivists 
want to simply offer an expressivist account of language use without employing 
semantic properties in their theoretical ontology. In this way, they can refrain 
from endorsing (1) and are not vulnerable to the threat of inconsistency that it 
brings. 
Rorty makes the same quietist point in more general terms. He advises global 
pragmatists not to go along with their opponents’ vocabulary and refuse to answer 
questions that presuppose their opponents’ distinctions: 
 
I think it is important that we who are accused of relativism stop using the dis-
tinctions between finding and making, discovery and invention, objective and 
subjective /---/ We must repudiate the vocabulary our opponents use, and not let 
them impose it upon us. [This means] that we must avoid Platonism and meta-
physics, in that wide sense of metaphysics in which Heidegger said that meta-
physics is Platonism. (Rorty 1999: xviii)  
 
Rorty insists that we abandon the distinction between representational and non-
representational truth along with other Platonistic contrasts. Thus, analogously to 
Price, Rorty would dismiss (1) as a statement forced upon the global pragmatists 
by their opponents’ ways of speaking. 
However, my alternative meta-semantic solution comes with at least two 
advantages over the quietist response (see Sova 2019: 511–513). First, my 
solution enables to state explicitly and consistently what global pragmatism is. 
Global pragmatism is defined namely by two commitments: discourse priority 
and non-representational meta-semantics. Quietists abandon the second commit-
ment. But if so, then how could they state the difference between global prag-
matism and representationalism? If representationalists hold on to their semantics 
and global pragmatists simply say nothing about it, it might appear as if their 
projects are mutually compatible. If the pragmatist position would be limited to 
the claim that terms do not represent or refer, and the only semantic framework 
available was the representationalist one, then the representationalist could legit-
imately accuse the pragmatist of being inconsistent. The structure that I propose 
in my dissertation provides a straightforward solution to these issues. 
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The second advantage is that with my solution, the global pragmatist can 
accept representational discourses on the non-semantic object level. This feature 
allows global pragmatists to accommodate the correspondence intuition – i.e., the 
intuition that important parts of our language seem to represent how things are in 
the world. It seems useful for communities to engage in language games that are 
best described as representational – games in which we act as if there is a world 
out there, waiting to be captured by our true sentences. Also, the distinctions 
between finding and making, discovery and invention, objective and subjective 
that Rorty urges us to abandon could likewise be useful for various purposes. By 
retaining these distinctions, however, global pragmatists who adhere to non-
representational meta-semantics are not suggesting that they have some hold on 
how things really are beyond our current discursive practices.  
 
 
4.4. Counterargument from the equivalence 
schema for truth 
There is a potential counterargument to the structural solution that I propose. 
I discuss the argument in the context of assessment-relativism in (Sova 2021). In 
this section, I consider the argument in the context of global pragmatism. For a 
more elaborate treatment of the argument we would have to consider it in the 
context of a specific non-representational semantics that is endorsed by some 
particular version of global pragmatism. However, the following outline never-
theless shows that there is no general counterargument from the equivalence 
schema to the meta-semantic structure that I am proposing. 
The meta-semantic solution for global pragmatists presupposes that we do not 
have to apply the representational truth-predicate to semantic sentences that 
ascribe the representational truth-predicate to non-semantic statements. However, 
consider the propositional equivalence schema, which the truth-predicate is 
standardly subject to: 
 
(ES) <p> is true iff p 
 
The problem stems from the observation that if the proposition on the right-hand 
side of ES gets one type of semantic interpretation, then the left side must get the 
same type of interpretation (see (Kölbel 2011: 17–20) and (MacFarlane 2014: 93) 
for the argument in the context of relativism). For example, if the proposition on 
the right is interpreted representationally, then the left-hand side must be inter-
preted representationally as well. It might seem that this forces us to accept the 
representational reading of the truth-predicate on the left-hand side. This would 
pose a problem for the solution advanced here, for in that case, any ascription of 
the representational truth-predicate to any proposition would entail, per the equi-
valence schema, that this ascription itself must be apt for the representational 
truth-predicate. If so, then the global pragmatist could not consider any non-
semantic statements as apt for representational truth. 
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However, I argue that these observations do not entail that the interpretation 
of the truth-predicate is forced by the interpretation of the proposition on the right. 
In order to satisfy the equivalence, it suffices that only the proposition on the left 
is given the same kind semantic interpretation as the proposition on the right, 
while the interpretation of the predicate predicated to that proposition is up for 
grabs. Thus, the equivalence does not determine the interpretation of the truth-
predicate on the left side and we are free to interpret it either representationally 
or non-representationally. This might in turn affect how we understand the pro-
position that the truth-predicate is predicated to, but in that case the proposition 
on the right gets re-interpreted accordingly as well. For example, let us suppose 
that the proposition on the right is interpreted representationally. Then the 
required representational interpretation of the left-hand side is imposed by the 
proposition itself. In that case, for global pragmatists, applying the truth-predicate 
on the proposition effectively says the following: the representationally inter-
preted proposition is non-representationally true. For representationalists, how-
ever, the left-hand side as a whole says the following: the representationally inter-
preted proposition is representationally true. The equivalence is then established 
by the fact that the proposition on the right gets the same meta-semantic inter-
pretation. In any case, the meta-semantic interpretation of the truth-predicate is a 




Representationalism and global pragmatism are two opposing worldviews or 
general ways of thought. Their opposition captures two antithetical tendencies 
(both philosophical and pre-philosophical) in how we see the relation between 
meaning and the world. Representationalists give priority to our intuition that 
there is an independent world out there that we can objectively investigate. Global 
pragmatists warn us not to indulge in such metaphysical urges, for there is no 
access to this purported world (or anything else, for that matter) except via our 
discursive practices. Not only do these urges lead to unnecessary metaphysical 
problems, but they also meddle with our reflections on how our ends change in 
time and thus hinder our capabilities as a community to adjust our practices 
accordingly. For this reason, global pragmatists invite us to concentrate on how 
we make use of various meaningful expressions for various purposes instead. 
Skeptical arguments by Putnam and Kripke force us to look for a consistent 
formulation for each of these opposing ways of thought. Representationalists 
need to make room for robust semantic facts and global pragmatists need to 
address the troubles with meaning-minimalism. As I have explained, the best way 
around these worries for pragmatists is adopting a bifurcated semantics together 
with the postulate that meta-semantics is non-representational. With this solution 
at hand, we can see that the best way to describe the difference between the 
representationalist and global pragmatist position is not in terms of whether some 
non-semantic sentence represents reality, but precisely whether semantic sentences 
represent reality. Representationalists think that they do, global pragmatists think 
that they do not.  
Although this structure allows global pragmatists to accept representational 
non-semantic discourses, it would still be a metaphysically modest position suit-
able for a pragmatist – the object-level representationalism gets deflated in meta-
semantics. In this way, global pragmatism accommodates the intuition that our 
statements and thoughts sometimes seem to capture how things are in the external 
world, and also accounts for the inevitable discourse-dependency of our under-
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Globaalse pragmatismi loogiliselt kooskõlaline struktuur 
Väitekirja peamine eesmärk on kirjeldada globaalse pragmatismi loogiliselt koos-
kõlalist struktuuri. Pragmatismi all pean silmas keelefilosoofilist vaadet, mille 
järgi lausete tähendus ja tõesus tuleneb sellest, kuidas keelekõnelejate kogukond 
kasutab keelt oma eesmärkide saavutamiseks. Sellega vastanduvad pragmatistid 
representatsionistlikule arusaamale, et keel mingis mõttes esitab keelest ja 
vaimust sõltumatut maailma. Globaalne pragmatism on nüüdisaegne pragma-
tismi vool, kus representatsionistlik vaade lükatakse tagasi kogu tähendusliku 
keelemängu ulatuses. Oma väitekirjas esitan struktuuri, kuidas globaalsed prag-
matistid saaksid seda loogiliselt kooskõlaliselt teha. 
Väitekiri koosneb ülevaateartiklist ja kolmest eelretsenseeritud artiklist, mis 
on ilmunud rahvusvahelistes teadusajakirjades. Ülevaateartikli sissejuhatavas 
osas selgitan globaalset pragmatismi, väitekirja põhiväidet ja tähendusteoreetilist 
konteksti, millesse väitekiri asetub. Globaalne pragmatism on määratletud kahe 
sidumuse kaudu: diskursuse prioriteetsus ja globaalne mitte-representatsionism. 
Esimene tähendab seda, et filosoofiliste küsimuste üle juurdlemisel – mis asjad 
on olemas? mis on moraal, tähendus, vaim jne? – ei peaks me keskenduma mitte 
metafüüsikale, vaid diskursusele, kus need küsimused kerkivad. Metafüüsika ase-
mel tuleks uurida seda, kuidas ja milleks kogukonnad kasutavad erinevaid tähen-
duslikke üksusi nagu väited, teooriad, mõtted ja uskumused. Teine sidumus – 
globaalne mitte-representatsionism – tähendab seda, et pole olemas väiteid, dis-
kursusi ega keelemänge, mis suudaksid esitada inimestest sõltumatut maailma, 
nii nagu see mingis metafüüsilises mõttes päriselt on. Globaalseteks pragmatisti-
deks võib 20. saj teises pooles pidada selliseid filosoofe nagu Ludwig Wittgen-
stein (hilisel perioodil), Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom ja Huw Price.  
Pragmatistid toovad oma maailmavaate toetuseks välja mitmeid põhjendusi. 
Representatsionistlik arusaam keele ja maailma vahekorrast eeldab, justkui 
pääseksime kuidagi ligi objektiivsele reaalsusele. Pragmatistid rõhutavad, et see 
pole võimalik, sest kõik meie maailma-uuringud on alati piiratud inimlike sattu-
muslike asjaoludega, nagu näiteks meie meeled, tehnoloogiad, eesmärgid ja prak-
tikad. Selle paratamatusega tuleb ka tähendusteoorias arvestada. Järelduseks on, 
et laused saavad tähenduslikuks üksnes kehtestatud keelemängu raames, kus 
ühed väited on süstemaatiliselt seotud teiste väidetega ja nii tekkinud semantilise 
võrgustiku eesmärgipärasel rakendamisel sünnib ka üksiku semantilise üksuse 
tähendus. Sellisest diskursiivsest praktikast ei pääse tähenduslikult välja, taba-
maks maailma oletatavat loomust. Niisiis pragmatistid leiavad, et parem oleks 
vaibutada selliseid metafüüsilisi tunge, mis panevad meid arvama, et esiteks on 
mingi kindel viis, kuidas maailmas asjad on, ja teiseks, et meie väljendus-
vahendid tabavad seda. 
Väitekirja ülevaateartikli teises osas annan lühikese ülevaate kolmest teadus-
artiklist ja sellest, kuidas nad on väitekirja keskse ideega seotud. 
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I artiklis, „The Dilemma Imposed on the Realist by Putnam’s and Kripken-
steinian Argument“, mis ilmus ajakirjas „Studia Philosophica Estonica“ (2017, 
nr 10.1), käsitlen Hilary Putnami ja Saul Kripke (nn Kripkensteini argument) 
vastuargumenti representatsionismile. Need argumendid ekspluateerivad loogi-
liselt järjekindlalt pragmatistide rõhutatud kimbatust, et meil tegelikult puudub 
objektiivne ligipääs metafüüsiliselt sõltumatule reaalsusele. Artiklis argumen-
teerin, et need skeptilised argumendid sunnivad meid tegema valiku. Ühelt poolt 
on nii, et kui soovitakse jääda representatsionistiks, siis tuleb tunnistada mitte-
empiirilisi semantilisi fakte (robustne representatsionism). Teiselt poolt aga, kui 
soovitakse representatsionism tagasi lükata, siis tuleb omaks võtta seisukoht, et 
tähendusomistustel pole representatsionistlikke tõetingimusi (tähendusminima-
lism). Globaalsed pragmatistid soovivad representatsionismi tõrjuda ja seega 
paljastavad Putnami ja Kripke argumendid, et globaalsed pragmatismid peavad 
tegelema tähendusminimalismist võrsuvate probleemidega. Nimelt on Crispin 
Wright ja Paul Boghossian esitanud argumente, mille järelduseks paistab olevat, 
et tähendusminimalism on loogiliselt vasturääkiv. Ma jällegi leian, et neid argu-
mente saab tõrjuda. Nendele argumentidele vastamise kontekstis võrsubki glo-
baalse pragmatismi kooskõlaline struktuur. Selle artikli lõpuosas käsitlen Wrighti 
argumenti, Boghossiani argumendiga tegelen II artiklis.  
 
II artiklis – „A Non-substantial Meta-semantics for Global Expressivism“, mis 
ilmus ajakirjas „Acta Analytica“ (2019, nr 34) – esitan globaalse pragmatismi 
loogiliselt kooskõlalise struktuuri. Käsitlen Paul Boghossiani argumenti tähen-
dusminimalismi vastu Huw Price’i globaalse pragmatismi versiooni globaalse 
ekspressivismi kontekstis. Crispin Wrighti ettepanekute eeskujul pakun tähendus-
minimalismile välja metasemantilise lahenduse, mida saab siis rakendada glo-
baalse pragmatismi kooskõlalisuse tagamiseks. Globaalsed pragmatistid peaksid 
keelemängude kirjeldamisel lähtuma dualistlikust semantikast (representatsio-
nistlik ja mitte-representatsionistlik, artiklis olen kasutanud selle eristuse tege-
miseks mõisteid substantsiaalne ja mitte-substantsiaalne semantika) ja eeldama, 
et metasemantika on mitte-representatsionistlik. 
 
III artiklis „Assessment relativism and the truth-predicate“, mis ilmub ajakirjas 
„Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum“ (2021) käsitlen argumenti, 
et John MacFarlane’i relativismi-versioonis toob relativism ükskõik millise väite 
osas kaasa ka relativismi tõepredikaadi osas. Argumenteerin, et seda ei juhtu 
propositsioonilise tõepredikaadi korral. See arutluskäik on väitekirja põhiväite 
suhtes oluline, sest argumenti saab rakendada ka globaalsele pragmatismile. Kui 
argument kehtiks, tähendaks see seda, et globaalsed pragmatistid, tunnistades 
mõne mitte-semantilise väite korral representatsionistlikku tõepredikaati, peaksid 
ka tõepredikaati ennast käsitlema representatsionistlikult. See tähendaks, et nad 
ei saa anda mõnele väitele representatsionistlikku tõlgendust ja ikkagi pidada 
metasemantikat mitte-representatsionistlikuks. Argument aga ei kehti ja ma selgi-
tan seda globaalse pragmatismi kontekstis ülevaateartikli peatükis 4.4. 
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Ülevaateartikli 3. osas kirjeldan I artiklis käsitletud Putnami mudel-teoreetilist ja 
Kripke nn Kripkensteini argumente representatsionismi vastu. Kokkuvõttes 
sunnivad need argumendid meid otsima kooskõlalist vormi kahele vastandlikule 
arusaamale keele ja maailma vahekorrast – representatsionismile ja globaalsele 
pragmatismile. Tulemuseks on, et representatsionistid peavad tunnistama mitte-
empiirilisi semantilisi fakte, mis teeb nende maailmavaate mõnevõrra müsti-
liseks. Globaalsed pragmatistid aga on sunnitud otsima lahendust tähendus-
minimalismi võimalikule ennastkummutavusele ja tulemuseks on minu väite-
kirjas välja pakutud metasemantiline lahendus.  
 
Ülevaateartikli 4. osas selgitangi loogiliselt kooskõlalise globaalse pragmatismi 
struktuuri. Probleemi olemus seisneb lühidalt selles, et globaalne pragmatist 
tahab esitada semantilise väite, et mitte üheski diskursuses ei representeeri tähen-
duslikud üksused keelevälist sõltumatut ja metafüüsiliselt objektiivset maailma. 
Vastuolu kerkib sellest, et samasugust mitte-representatsionistlikku hoiakut peavad 
nad rakendama ka semantikale enesele. Vastasel juhul ei oleks tegemist globaalse 
pragmatismiga ja ikkagi leiduks representatsionistlik keelemäng, semantika ise. 
Kui nüüd aga semantilised mõisted nagu representatsioon, osutus, tõde ja tähendus 
ise on mitte-representatsionistlikud, siis näib, et neid mõisteid saab triviaalselt 
rakendada ükskõik millisele keelemängule. Kui metasemantika on mitte-
representatsionistlik, siis näib, et pragmatistidel ei jää muud üle kui tunnistada, 
et iga tähenduslik lause ja sõna automaatselt representeerib midagi või osutab 
millelegi. Kui see aga nii on, siis mis mõttes saavad globaalsed pragmatistid olla 
globaalsed mitte-representatsionistid? Kuidas nad peaksid oma positsiooni 
võrreldes representatsionistidega määratlema? 
Crispin Wrighti ettepanekutest inspireerituna pakun globaalsele pragma-
tismile välja järgmise strukturaalse lahenduse. Globaalsed pragmatistid peaksid 
esmalt tunnistama, et keelt kasutavad kogukonnad mängivad semantiliselt vähe-
malt kahte liiki keelemänge. Ühtedes mängudes tähendab tõene väide seda, et see 
ütleb, kuidas asjad maailmas meist sõltumata on. Nii võiks tõlgendada näiteks 
loodusteaduslikke väiteid või igapäevaseid lauseid meid ümbritsevate objektide 
koha. Sellega käib kaasas ka representatsionistlik tähendusteooria üldisemalt. 
Lisaks sellele on aga ka keelemängud, kus rakendub pragmatistlik mitte-
representatsionistlik tähendusteooria. Nendes mängudes tähendab väite tõesus 
pigem seda, et see klapib mingisuguse omaksvõetud õigustusmustriga või et see 
aitab eesmärke saavutada. Sellised diskursused on näiteks eetika, esteetika, 
matemaatika ja mitmesugused keelemängud humanitaarteadustes. Sellise kaheks 
jaotunud semantika kontekstis saavad globaalsed pragmatistid kooskõlaliselt 
postuleerida, et meta-semantika on ainult mitte-representatsionistlik. See tähen-
dab, et semantilised laused ise – laused, mis sisaldavad mõnda semantilist terminit, 
nt „väide, et kohvitass on laual, on tõene ja esitab objektiivselt asjade seisu 
maailmas” – saavad olla tõesed või väärad ainult pragmatistlikus mõttes. Need 
pole tõesed ega väärad selles mõttes, et need esitavad mingi pildi metafüüsiliselt 
objektiivsetest semantilistest faktidest.  
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See struktuur tagab globaalse pragmatismi kooskõlalisuse. Pragmatistid ei pea 
tunnistama, et mitte-representatsionistlikus metasemantikas on iga diskursus 
automaatselt representatiivne. Nad saavad teha eristusi representatsionistlike ja 
mitte-representatsionistlike keelemängude vahel pragmatistlikus, mitte-represen-
tatsionistlikus taustsüsteemis. Samas aga mingi keelemängu kohta representatsio-
nismi kinnitades ei lähe pragmatistid iseendaga vastuollu, sest mitte-represen-
tatsionistlikus metasemantikas on representatsionismi mõiste siiski päris repre-
sentatsionistidele sobimatult õhuke. Vastuolu tekib siis, kui eeldada representat-
sionistlikku taustsüsteemi – pragmatistid aga ei pea selle eeldusega kaasa minema. 
See struktuur kehtestab globaalsete pragmatistide globaalse mitte-represen-
tatsionismi, sest mitte-representatsionistlikus meta-semantikas ei ulatu tähendus-
likud väited diskursuse raamidest välja, et tabada maailma metafüüsiliselt objek-
tiivset loomust. Objekt-tasandi representatsionism tühistatakse meta-semantikas 
ja see struktuur võimaldab globaalsetel pragmatistidel representatsionismi kõikjal 
kooskõlaliselt tõrjuda. Sellest võib mõelda ka nii, et mu mõtted igapäevaste mind 
ümbritsevate objektide kohta justkui tabaksid maailma nii nagu see on, aga meta-
mõte selle objektiivse tabamise enda kohta on alati ainult tõene mingis pragma-
tistlikus mõttes. See meta-tasandi metafüüsiline tagasihoidlikkus aitab meil 
kogukonnana paremini kohaneda kontekstide ja eesmärkide pideva ümber-
seadistamisega. Nii saavad metafüüsilised tungid mõistlikult kammitsetud. 
Sissejuhatava ülevaateartikli alapeatükis 4.2 käsitlen lühidalt seda, kuidas 
väitekirjas välja pakutud struktuuri saab rakendada ka muude globaliseerivate 
seisukohtade kooskõlalisuse tagamiseks, näiteks globaalsele relativismile. Ala-
peatükis 4.3 toon põhjendusi, miks minu lahendus on parem Huw Price’i ja 
Richard Rorty lahendusest. Nad pakuvad välja, et peaksime oma teoreetilises 
keeles loobuma sellistest eristustest nagu representatsionism ja mitte-represen-
tatsionism, mis näib olevat platonistliku mõtlemise jäänuk. Probleemiks see-
juures jääb, kuidas siis globaalset pragmatismi üldse määratleda. Minu lahendus 
aitab selgelt välja tuua, mis on globaalne pragmatism ja kuidas see erineb 
representatsionismist. Globaalse pragmatismi kaks sidumust saavad nüüd täpse-
malt sellise määratluse: diskursuse prioriteetsus ja mitte-representatsionistlik 
metasemantika. Teiseks aitab minu lahendus hallata representatsionistlikke 
intuitsioone: näib, et suur osa meie keelest on üles ehitatud nii, et see kirjeldab 
objektiivset maailma. Mitte-semantiliste väidete korral võime võtta hoiaku, et 
mingis mõttes nii ongi. Globaalsed pragmatistid aga rõhutavad, et ainult selles 
mõttes, et seda objektiivse maailma kirjeldamist ennast kirjeldavad laused on 
tõesed või väärad ainult mitte-representatsionistlikus mõttes. Nii tühistavad prag-
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